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Background: In 2007, the South African government introduced the occupation-specific dispensation (OSD),
a financial incentive strategy, to attract, motivate, and retain health professionals in the public sector.
Implementation commenced with the nursing sector, but there have been unintended negative consequences.
Objective: First, to examine implementation of the OSD for nurses using Hogwood and Gunn’s framework
that outlines ‘perfect implementation’ pre-conditions. Second, to highlight the conditions for the successful
implementation of financial incentives.
Methods: A qualitative case study design using a combination of a document review and in-depth interviews
with 42 key informants.
Results: The study found that there were several implementation weaknesses. Only a few of the pre-conditions
were met for OSD policy implementation. The information systems required for successful policy
implementation, such as the public sector human resource data base and the South African Nursing Council
register of specialised nurses were incomplete and inaccurate, thus undermining the process. Insufficient
attention was paid to time and resources, dependency relationships, task specification, and communication
and coordination.
Conclusion: The implementation of financial incentives requires careful planning and management in order to
avoid loss of morale and staff grievances.
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F
inancial incentives are a commonly used strategy
to improve health worker motivation and reten-
tion (1, 2). However, there is limited evidence of
their impact in low- and middle-income countries (3, 4)
or in rural and remote areas (1, 3). Rigoli and Dussault
have cautioned that the failure of many incentive schemes
to achieve expected results is due to poor design (5). The
problems of inappropriate or poorly designed policies are
exacerbated by policy implementation challenges, which
in turn may determine the impact of financial incentive
policies (6, 7). In most countries, policy makers have
limited guidance on how to implement financial incentive
strategies so that they can achieve their intended policy
objectives. For example, inequities, or perceived inequities
in the manner in which incentive strategies are designed
and implemented have been documented as a source of
demotivation (4). Increasing attention has thus been paid
to understanding the problems of policy implementation
in order to identify key contributing factors to the failure
to achieve the desired impact (8).
In South Africa, several authors have analysed the
disjuncture between policies or plans, on the one hand,
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and implementation, on the other hand. These have
included studies on mental health (911), HIV and AIDS
(1215), hospital rationalisation and restructuring (12,
14), municipal health services (16), social inclusion (17),
and user fees (18). A few studies have looked at policies
on remuneration or incentives (1921). Several problems
have been identified. Stack and Hlela, and Khosa
found that the challenges included hurried policy
implementation; limited consultation with the imple-
menting actors; lack of prioritisation, insufficient time,
and a lack of co-ordination between different government
departments (12, 14). Rispel et al. found that inadequate
administrative and implementation capacity, insufficient
resources, corruption, and lack of involvement of civil
servants beset the implementation of various social
policies (17), while challenges of varying technical capac-
ity at different government levels influenced the imple-
mentation of mental health policy (11).
Although these studies provide important insights into
the factors that plague policy implementation, there is
a dearth of studies that analyse the implementation of
policies on remuneration or financial incentives (1921).
In light of the global human resource crisis, analysis
of policy implementation of financial incentives is
important to guide policy makers, as these are the most
commonly used staff retention strategies.
In South Africa, public sector conditions of service
(issues such as remuneration or working hours) are
determined on the basis of a central collective bargaining
process between the employer (government) and recog-
nised labour representatives (unions or professional
associations), in line with provisions of the Labour
Relations Act (22).
In 2007, the South African government introduced the
occupation-specific dispensation (OSD), a financial in-
centive strategy to attract, motivate, and retain health
professionals in the public health sector (23). The OSD
policy defines the remuneration structure, frequency of
pay progression, grade progression opportunities, career
pathing, recognition of appropriate experience and re-
quired levels of performance (23, 24). Implementation
commenced with all categories of nurses, as they are the
majority of health care providers in South Africa and
because of the shortages of and high turnover among
nurses in clinical specialities, especially in critical care
wards and operating theatres.
Existing evidence suggests numerous problems with
the implementation of the OSD policy, ranging from
inadequate planning, budget overruns (25) and some
unintended negative consequences (26). These conse-
quences included unmet nurses’ expectations, inequities
in the amounts received, perceived unfairness, and
dissatisfaction and divisions among the different cate-
gories of nurses (26).
The article draws on the Hogwood and Gunn policy
implementation framework to analyse the implementation
of OSD and seeks to determine whether the manner in
which OSD was implemented caused these unintended
negative consequences. The article concludes with lessons
for South Africa and other countries, which could be used
to guide future financial incentive policies.
Conceptual framework
Although there are several theories and frameworks to
analyse policy implementation, this article uses Hogwood
and Gunn as an analytical framework (Table 1) to analyse
the implementation of OSD (7, 27). Hogwood and Gunn
make a distinction between ‘non-implementation’ and
‘unsuccessful implementation’. With ‘non-implementa-
tion’, policies are not put into effect as intended because
those involved in the implementation are inefficient or
because it was not possible to overcome obstacles despite
their best efforts. ‘Unsuccessful implementation’ refers
to a situation where the policy is fully implemented
but fails to produce the intended outcomes (7). Although
the framework is idealistic in that it suggests the notion
of ‘perfect’ implementation, it is useful to consider
the preconditions and key features necessary for the
successful policy implementation of complex financial
incentives.
Methods
The study was approved by the University of the
Witwatersrand Committee for Research on Human
Subjects and the Provincial Health Research Ethics
Committees in the two provinces that participated in
the study. Hospital managers were also asked for
permission to access their facilities. All participants
provided informed consent after receiving a study in-
formation sheet.
Study design
A descriptive case study design was used, combining a
review of policy documents and in-depth interviews with
key informants who were knowledgeable on OSD policy
design and/or implementation. The document review
included relevant government documents including pol-
icy directives (23, 24) and media releases (2830) in order
to understand the context and content of the OSD
implementation.
Study sites and setting
The study was conducted in North West and Gauteng
provinces between 2008 and 2010. North West is a
predominantly rural province with a population of 3.2
million (6.4% of the total South African population) while
Gauteng is an urban province with a population of 11.1
million (22.4% of the total population). We selected a total
of 10 hospitals in the two provinces. Out of 30 hospitals in
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North West province, three were purposively selected1 to
ensure inclusion of those hospitals that were part of the
hospital revitalisation programme and two were selected
randomly. Similarly, in Gauteng province, one hospital
was purposively selected while four were selected at
random.
Study participants and data collection
Forty-two key informants were selected purposively on
the basis of their influence or knowledge of the OSD
policy or their involvement with OSD implementation,
using a snowballing sampling technique. The key infor-
mants consisted of the following groups of stakeholders:
national government (7), provincial government (n12),
academics (n7), statutory body (n1), nursing orga-
nisations (n4), nursing unions (n3), and hospital
managers who were available at their facilities on the day
of data collection (n8).
The selected key informants were interviewed using a
semi-structured interview guide. The questions focused
on the background and context of OSD for nurses,
actors and their responsibilities, implementation of
OSD, successes of the OSD implementation, challenges
experienced, and recommendations.
Data analysis
A thematic content analysis of the documents and
transcripts was conducted (31) using ATLAS.ti. To ensure
coding consistency, two researchers (one being the first
author) independently read at least seven transcripts and
discussed discrepancies until agreement on the codes was
reached.
Results
Table 2 shows the extent to which OSD implementation
met the preconditions and key features necessary for
successful policy implementation, proposed by Hogwood
and Gunn. Although these conditions overlap, each is
elaborated below for the sake of clarity.
Precondition 1: external constraints
External obstacles ‘may be political in that either policy
or the measures needed to achieve it are unacceptable to
interests (such as party activists, trade unions, or in some
societies, the military) which have the power to veto
them’(27).
Although OSD was part of ongoing government efforts
to recruit and retain health care professionals in the
public sector, intense lobbying by organised labour,
particularly by the Democratic Nursing Organisation of
South Africa (DENOSA), for improved remuneration
and a protracted public servants strike during 2007
accelerated its implementation (32). However, the strike
influenced the ability of government to plan adequately.
A key external constraint was contestations regard-
ing the prioritisation of nurses over other health care
professionals in the OSD implementation, especially
among the recognised labour organisations in the central
bargaining chamber. One informant commented as
follows:
At that time, government said I have got X amount
of money to improve the salaries of health profes-
sionals, but it is not enough to improve the salaries
of everybody. Now all of us as health professionals
had to say ‘start with us’ so it was so difficult.
So when we thought that we had convinced the
government to start with the nurses, when it went to
the Bargaining Chamber with other trade unions,
we were seen as people that were promoting elitism.
We were asked ‘why only nurses, what about
cleaners?’ (KII 18, Nursing Union)
Table 1. Conceptual framework
Hogwood and Gunn’s 10 preconditions for implementation (27)
Stage Description of the practice
External constraints Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraints
Time and resources Adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the programme
Resource combination The required combination of resources is available
Theory-based policy The policy to be implemented is based on a valid theory of cause and effect
Cause/effect relations The relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there are few, if any intervening links
Dependency relationships The dependency relationships are minimal
Agreements of objectives There is agreement of, and understanding on, objectives
Events sequencing The tasks are fully specified in correct sequence
Communication/coordination There is perfect communication and coordination
Total compliance Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance
1The purposive selection was done to ensure that hospitals
undergoing revitalisation were included, as it constituted the focus
of the broader study.
Prudence Ditlopo et al.
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Preconditions 2 and 3: adequate time and resources
Both Gauteng and North West provinces reported using
the OSD policy for implementation. Task teams were
established at some hospitals, and these hospital man-
agers reported fewer implementation challenges.
One of the reasons for the success of the OSD
process was the formation of the task teams prior
to implementation. (Assistant Nursing Manager,
Central Hospital, Gauteng)
A combination of resources is required according to the
Hogwood and Gunn framework, which assumes that if
one or more of the resources is delayed, the project is set
back by several months (27). Although the intention was
for OSD to be implemented by March 2008 (23), actual
implementation was delayed until September 2008; and
even then, not all provinces implemented it at the same
time. There were inconsistencies in the benefits nurses
received among the different provinces and institutions.
This led to confusion and disgruntlement.
Insufficient time was allocated for the training of the
implementers at institution level, there was no reference
made in the OSD policy to who would be trained on OSD
implementation or the length of the training (23), so this
aspect was neglected. Thus reinforcing, a common reason
why policies do not achieve the stated intentions is that
too much is expected too soon (27). There was consensus
amongst hospital managers that OSD was implemented
in a rushed and pressured manner.
I think the way OSD was implemented, it was in a
rush, there were deadlines to say on a certain date
implementation must start. It was putting a lot of
people under pressure. I think it would have been
done smarter if it was done at a natural pace and
everybody has been comfortable with the implemen-
tation. (Hospital Manager 4, District Hospital,
Gauteng Province)
In terms of financial resources, around R1, 5 billion
(equivalent to US$ 200 million; 1$7.5 South African
Rands) was allocated for OSD for nurses for the 2007
financial year (Department of Health, 2007). This amount
was insufficient for several reasons. Firstly, a sub-optimal
human resource information system resulted in an under-
count of the total number of nurses in the public health
sector by 10,000 individuals. Although this was a policy
design problem, it had ramifications during implementa-
tion. Hence, the implementation of the OSD proved to be
more expensive than previously planned, illustrated by the
comment from one key informant.
Table 2. Assessment of occupation-specific dispensation (OSD) implementation against Hogwood and Gunn conditions for
success
Hogwood and Gunn’s criteria OSD assessment
External constraints Widespread public sector strike accelerated implementation, contributing to insufficient
planning before implementation
Some contestation over prioritisation of nurses as the first health provider category to benefit
from OSD
Adequate time and resources OSD implementation was rushed
Insufficient financial resources
Limited human resources
Inadequate training of the implementers
Required combination of resources OSD policy guideline in the form of Resolution 3 of 2007
Poor human resource information system
Policy based on valid theory Philosophy of OSD policy supported
Policy not evidence based
Clear cause and effect relationship OSD would provide clear career paths and salary progression for nurses
Increase in salary will increase motivation and retention
Minimal dependency relationships Complex series of events
Dependent on nurses submitting proof of Nursing Council qualifications
Agreement of objectives The objective of OSD was to retain nurses within clinical areas
Vagueness in the definition of what constitutes specialisation
Sequencing of events Roles of implementation stakeholder not made explicit
Announcement made prior to ensuring sufficient and combination of resources
Communication and coordination Weak communication to frontline nurses
Poor coordination amongst key actors
Total compliance Varied interpretation at institution and provincial level
Overpayments and underpayments
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It became clear that the government doesn’t know
how many nurses they actually have. I remember
they were even roughly quoting figures, only to find
that they under-budgeted around 10,000 nurses.
(KII 18, Nursing Union)
A second key challenge was that financial resources were
not made available immediately at the hospital level,
resulting in problems for individual hospital managers.
The people who planned it [OSD] are wrong because
you can’t plan to give people money whilst you don’t
have that money at hand. In our case, we had to pay
the nurses even though we didn’t budget for OSD.
It was said that the budget for OSD will come
from the province, but it never came at that
time. (Hospital Manager 9, District Hospital, North
West Province)
Lastly, insufficient financial resources were exacerbated
by problems of overpayment of some nurses, and this
meant that hospitals could not fill vacant posts.
People were paid more than they were supposed to
be paid, so that’s why now we can’t even fill vacant
posts. (Hospital Manager 9, District Hospital,
North West)
Preconditions 4 and 5: valid theory, clear cause, and
effect relationship
The study found that Hogwood and Gunn’s precondi-
tions 4 and 5 were met. There was general agreement
amongst respondents that OSD was a ‘good’ policy,
which was informed by the human resource problems in
the public health sector, illustrated by the following
comments:
Well, in theory it [OSD] was a brilliant idea and it
should have gone a long way to solve some of the
problems. (KII 7, Gauteng Department of Health)
The nurses’ OSD remains the best possible policy to
address the issues within nursing. (KII 20, Nursing
Union)
The OSD also attracted nurses from overseas back into
the country and from the private to the public health
sector.
But I have realised that when I was in PE, just
before I came here, the introduction of the OSD
attracted a lot nurses from the private sector . . .
when I came here in 2008 February, we employed
about 160 nurses from the private sector. (KII 10,
Eastern Cape Department of Health)
. . . turnover was high . . . there was a time when we
were really struggling to recruit nurses, but I must
say the OSD made a huge difference because we
are able to recruit people from private sector
and we also got two nurses from overseas. (Hospital
Manager 4, District Hospital, Gauteng Province)
Key informants were also of the opinion that OSD
encouraged nurses to improve their qualification or to
specialise in critical care or operating theatre technique.
Nevertheless, some respondents pointed out that
OSD was not based on research evidence and were of
the opinion that formative research should have been
conducted to shape this policy.
I think before they could implement it [OSD],
they were supposed to do thorough research and
correct calculations. (Hospital Manager 9, District
Hospital)
For precondition 5, it can be argued that the causal chain
was direct (7). This is because there was an expectation
from policy makers that an increase in salary would
increase recruitment and retention of nurses.
Precondition 6: minimal dependency relationships
Minimal dependency relationships imply that there
should be a single implementing agency or if other
agencies are involved, that the dependency relation-
ships are minimal both in number and importance (27).
However, in terms of the South Africa constitution,
health is a concurrent function (or joint responsibility)
of the national and provincial governments, with national
government responsible for overall policy development,
while the nine provincial health departments are the
implementing agencies. Invariably, this decentralisation
resulted in different interpretations and variations in
policy implementation.
OSD implementation was also dependent indirectly
on other agencies such as the South African Nursing
Council (SANC), as nurses were required to submit proof
of their registration and specialised qualifications with
the SANC. Nurses were also required to produce their
length of service record. Consequently, an informant
from a nursing union blamed the SANC for failure to
record the relevant nursing qualifications.
I must say SANC nearly failed the [nurses] on OSD,
there are things in SANC that we must correct,
around the registration of certain courses, accred-
itation of courses and so forth because we have a
large chunk of nurses who were left out of the OSD
because they are not regarded as speciality. (KII 20,
Nursing Union)
On the other hand, SANC shifted the blame on the
nurses for their tardiness in registering their qualifications
and only doing so when these were required as part of the
OSD implementation.
Precondition 7: agreement of objectives
The document review suggests that the policy makers
did not take into account the complexities of the
various nursing specialities. One respondent remarked
as follows:
Prudence Ditlopo et al.
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Nursing is a complicated profession, there are
different specialities. So nursing OSD is not as
straight forward as any OSD. I think there were
grey areas in the implementation of OSD or no
clarity (KII 27, Nursing Manager)
For example, the OSD policy lacked clarity on how
nurses with more than one speciality were to be rewarded.
Furthermore, a grandfather clause was introduced that
allowed nurses who worked in a speciality area, but
without the formal qualification, to benefit from OSD.
On the other hand, those with the formal qualification,
but not working in the specialised area could not benefit.
This resulted in unhappiness among those nurses and
movement of some nurses out of managerial positions
back to the specialised area, where OSD was paid.
A document review of a letter by the Principal Specialist
and Head of one Gauteng hospital to SANC chairperson
noted some of these concerns:
Fewer registered nurses are choosing to work in
medical wards following the implementation of
the Occupational Specific Dispensation (OSD).
This is because medical nurses do not qualify
for OSD as there is not a recognised post-basic
qualification in medical nursing. Consequently,
there are fewer registered nurses in medical wards
and care of medical inpatients is severely compro-
mised. (Principal Specialist and Head, Regional
Hospital, Gauteng Province)
Precondition 8: sequencing of events
The announcement on the OSD was made by the then
Minister of Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang prior
to ensuring that sufficient financial and human resources
were in place. This on its own created a lot of confusion
and dismay among nurses when the implementation was
delayed at provincial level.
Another important element of sequencing is that the
role of each stakeholder involved in the implementation
process should be made explicit (27). The OSD policy did
not state the responsibilities of provincial or hospital
managers explicitly nor the steps required for effective
implementation. This resulted in variations in implemen-
tation across the nine provinces. One hospital manager
commented as follows:
Provinces did as they wish, that’s why a nurse in here
can be paid differently from a nurse in Eastern Cape
or a nurse in Limpopo province. For me, the current
system does not work because provinces are inde-
pendent entities; national [government] usually can
say here is a guideline and provinces can decide
on how they implement it. (Hospital Manager 7,
Provincial Hospital, North West Province)
In the study provinces, the OSD implementation was
the responsibility of the Human Resource divisions of the
provincial health departments. However, they were not
familiar with nursing training and specialities. This
challenge was exacerbated by the unavailability of uni-
form instructions and inadequate training to support
these managers. It was left to these human resource
managers to define their role, liaise with the hospital or
provincial managers and fulfil these undefined roles to
the best of their abilities.
Precondition 9: communication and coordination
The OSD policy clearly stipulated that its fundamental
underpinnings are ‘career pathing’, ‘pay and grade
progression’, ‘specialty’ as well as ‘competencies’ and
‘performance’. For instance, one of the objectives noted
in the policy reads as follows:
To provide adequate and clear salary progression
and career pathing opportunities based on compe-
tencies, experience and performance. (OSD Policy,
Resolution 3 of 2007)
However, there were many mixed messages sent out to
nurses, who either received information from the media
or their labour organisations. In the media, OSD was
promoted as a general nurses’ salary increase and one
informant commented as follows:
Unfortunately in the eyes of the nurses, it [OSD] was
more about the salary increment. Nurses look at
their salary and say ‘no, but this thing [OSD] did not
benefit me’. (KII 2, Nursing Union)
Hence, the communication did not emphasise the funda-
mentals of OSD, resulting in disappointment and un-
realistic expectations among nurses. Communication and
coordination between the National Department of
Health and provinces were also inadequate, and it was
not clear what support was given to provinces during
implementation or how the provinces in turn supported
the districts and hospitals. It was also not clear whether
and how coordination happened between the SANC and
the provinces or health facilities.
Precondition 10: total compliance
This precondition suggests that those in authority can
demand and obtain perfect compliance. However, the
authority for implementation was diffused as the nine
provinces and different categories of health facility
(primary care centre vs. hospital) interpreted the OSD
guidelines differently. Key informants pointed out that in
both study provinces, implementation varied across
health facilities at the same level, and also between
primary health care facilities and hospitals. Inadvertently,
OSD contributed to further ‘imbalances’ in the distribu-
tion of nurses between hospital and primary health care
facilities as well as between provinces.
Lastly, because there was not ‘total compliance’ in
terms of policy implementation, accountability was also
diffused, and no one took responsibility for implementa-
tion challenges. Instead, it became a vicious cycle of
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blame: the National Department of Health blamed the
provinces, the provinces blamed the hospital manage-
ment, the hospital management blamed the unions, and
the unions blamed the SANC, that ironically does not
have a mandate for any implementation or participation
in financial incentives.
Discussion
This study used Hogwood and Gunn’s 10 preconditions
for ‘perfect implementation’ (27) to assess the implemen-
tation process of the OSD. Although the framework has
been criticised for being idealistic and impossible to
achieve (33), it provides useful insights into the challenges
of implementing financial incentive policies. The frame-
work is particularly useful in identifying the strengths
and weaknesses of the policy implementation process,
thus contributing to knowledge on the implementation
processes of financial incentives.
The study found that very few of the preconditions
were met, namely that the policy was based upon a valid
theory of cause and effect and that the relationship
between cause and effect is direct (27).
The study found that a number of preconditions were
not met, and this resulted in sub-optimal implementation
(34). The challenges included time and resources, depen-
dency relationships, task specification, and communica-
tion and coordination. For instance, problems with OSD
policy implementation that were demonstrated by other
policy implementation studies in South Africa (11, 12, 14)
included rushed implementation, lack of consultation
with or orientation of provincial health departments of
health facility managers, lack of proper time scales, and
insufficient resources. Because OSD is a financial incen-
tive, with long-term financial implications, these chal-
lenges have to be addressed in the planned revision of
OSD policy (35).
The implementation of OSD was decentralised, mean-
ing that the responsibility for implementation, including
funding was delegated from national to provincial health
departments and from the province down to district, sub-
district and hospital levels. As was found in other studies
(14, 36), this decentralisation resulted in insufficient
coordination among different stakeholders and different
interpretations and variations in OSD policy implemen-
tation. As Jeppson rightly pointed out, policy implemen-
tation in a decentralised system is complex and must be
understood in a misdirected translation process (37).
Consistent with existing policy implementation studies
(12, 14, 19, 32), we also found that there was insufficient
communication between the different levels of the health
departments. Improved communication might have fa-
cilitated better implementation (32).
There are several limitations in this study. The use of
Hogwood and Gunn’s framework limits a detailed ana-
lysis of the actors that were involved in policy processes or
the identification of intended and unintended impact.
This framework further assumes that policy implementa-
tion is a linear progression. In practice, this is not the case
and it is unlikely that all 10 preconditions of Hogwood
and Gunn would be in place prior to implementation
of most government policies. Also, the framework
does not take into account that setbacks in policy making
and implementation are opportunities for revisions,
redesign, and self-correction (38). The study was done
in two provinces, which limits its generalisability, and
the use of key informants reflects their opinions at a
point in time.
Nonetheless, there are important lessons to be learned
from this case study that could inform the planned
revision of the OSD policy. These lessons include
the need for better planning and management of the
implementation process, careful communication, and
change management to ensure that unrealistic expecta-
tions are not created, as well as the development of
detailed guidelines for implementers and extensive train-
ing of these implementers. There is also the need for clear
monitoring and evaluation indicators that will allow
problems to be picked up at an early stage. This will
allow for remedial action to be taken. These lessons
are also useful in light of the planned implementation
of major health care reforms, notably the National
Health Insurance System, thus avoiding a repeat of these
mistakes on a much bigger scale.
Conclusion
The success of financial incentives depends on the
manner and process of implementation. Implementation
weaknesses can be overcome by paying attention to the
conditions needed for successful implementation, namely
better planning and management of the implementation
process, improved communication and coordination, de-
tailed guidelines for implementers, and clear monitoring
and evaluation indicators. However, in acknowledging
that ‘perfect implementation’ is rarely achievable, set-
backs in implementation of financial incentives should
be taken as an opportunity for revisions, redesign, and
self-correction.
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